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NOTES
SHEDDING TIERS FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED:
CITY OF CLEBURNE v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER
I. INTRODUCTION
[T1 say that [equal protection] decisions do not fall into a neat pattern
is not to say that they fall into no pattern. In fact, they illustrate a not
unusual characteristic of legal development: broad principles are articu-
lated, narrowed when applied to new contexts, and finally replaced when
the distinctions they rely on are no longer tenable.'
For nearly ninety years, the constitutional analysis of federal equal pro-
tection controversies remained relatively constant.' Under the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court struck down most laws that classified along
racial or ethnic lines' and upheld most economic and social legislative
classifications." During the 1960's, the Warren Court began to invalidate
statutory classifications that impaired personal fundamental rights., The
Burger Court further altered conventional equal protection analysis by in-
validating classifications against different groups based on immutable traits
or historically unequal treatment. 6 The Court now uses three separate levels
I. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 436 (1982).
2. Compare Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165 (1897) (legislative
classifications must be justly and properly related to reasonable grounds) with City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (economic legislation must be rationally related to
a legitimate state purpose).
3. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); Casteneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482 (1977) (national origin).
4. See, e.g.. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983) (tax on oil and gas which
exempted royalty owners but not others does not deny equal protection); City of New Orleans
v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (ordinance exempting pushcart food sales in operation for more
than eight years from ban on that business does not deny equal protection); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (ceiling on welfare payments upheld as rational); Allied Stores
of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959) (statute exempting nonresidents from ad valorem
tax does not violate equal protection); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (statute
barring anyone but licensed optometrists or ophthalmologists from fitting or replacing lenses
without a prescription does not deny equal protection).
5. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (denial of welfare benefits
to state residents of less than one year's duration violates right to travel); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964) (dilution of voting strength violates equal protection); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (denial of counsel in an appeal of right to indigent criminal
defendants denies equal protection); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (denial of free
transcript to indigent criminal defendant for appeal of right denies equal protection).
6. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (gender); Matthews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495 (1976) (illegitimacy).
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of scrutiny7 to review legislative statutes: strict scrutiny,' heightened scrutiny,9
and minimum rationality. "'
7. See Blattner, The Supreme Court's "Intermediate" Equal Protection Decisions: Five
Imperfect Models of Constitutional Equality, 8 HASTINGS. CONST. L.Q. 777 (1981); Fox, Equal
Protection Analysis: Laurence Tribe, The Middle Tier, and the Role of the Court, 14 U.S.F.L.
REV. 525 (1980); Seeburger, The Muddle of the Middle Tier: The Coming Crisis in Equal
Protection, 48 Mo. L. REV. 587 (1983); Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming
Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 161, 161-63 (1984); Wilkinson, The
Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality,
61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975).
8. Strict scrutiny demands that legislative classifications bear a substantial relationship to
a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). The state has the burden of overcoming a presumption
of unconstitutionality. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343. This level of review has been .'strict' in theory
and fatal in fact." Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for the Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 8 (1972).
9. Heightened scrutiny applies to classifications that present particular constitutional dif-
ficulties, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217-18 (1982), and has been extended to classifications
involving gender, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and illegitimacy, Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). Classifications subject to heightened scrutiny will
be upheld only if they are substantially related to an important governmental objective. Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976). Heightened scrutiny sanctions a judicial balance of
important state interests against individual rights affected, and it provides greater latitude in
judicial review of suspect legislation without adding to the list of inherently suspect classifica-
tions. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1082-89 (1978). An embryonic form of
heightened scrutiny was applied by the Warren Court, particularly in cases in which legislation
was found to discriminate against the poor. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) (denial of appointed counsel on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (challenge
of fees for criminal trial transcripts). Many fundamental rights cases, like Douglas and Griffin,
deal with the effect of the justice system on the poor. See also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817
(1977) (states must provide poor prisoners with access to law libraries and must provide assistance
in preparing and filing meaningful legal papers); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
(states may not deny indigents access to court for dissolution of marriage merely for failure to
pay court fees and costs). The Burger Court has been reluctant to expand the rights of the
poor. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (no right to counsel for discretionary
appeal); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973) (no right to equal
education between "poor" school districts and "rich" school districts); United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973) (no fundamental right to declare bankruptcy); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970) (states may impose ceilings on welfare payments).
10. The minimum rationality test applies to legislation that is neither drawn along suspect
lines nor injurious to fundamental rights. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976). It presumes the constitutionality of such legislation and requires only that legislation be
minimally rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S.
176, 181 (1983); Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648,
668 (1981). The language the Court uses to describe this test is absolute. See, e.g., Turner v.
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970) (classification must be "wholly irrelevant" to state purpose);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) ("wholly unrelated"). A statute is "not required to resort
to close distinctions or to maintain precise, scientific uniformity with reference to composition."
Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959). A state may resort to both
underinclusion, Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955), and overinclusion,
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Each level of review applies to particular types of classifications and, in
the past, yielded predictable results. Strict scrutiny is used to review inherently
suspect classifications-race, national origin and alienagel'-as well as clas-
sifications that impair individual enjoyment of fundamental rights.' 2 Under
strict scrutiny, there is a strong presumption of unconstitutionality which
can only be overcome by showing that a classification is closely tailored to
a compelling state interest. 3 Heightened scrutiny is used to review "quasi-
suspect" classifications. ' 4 Quasi-suspect classifications share certain charac-
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). A state does not have to prove that the
effects of the legislation are actually related to the purpose. Rather, the court looks at whether
a legislature could reasonably have believed, at the time it passed the law, that the statute
would serve the asserted state purpose. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487-88.
II. See, e.g., Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (national origin); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race).
12. Successful equal protection challenges in the fundamental rights area fall into six
categories: (I) access to the courts and liberty interests of criminal defendants; see James v.
Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (indigent criminal defendants denied the same protective exemptions
as other debtors); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (incompetent criminal defendants
subjected to more liberal commitment standards and more stringent release standards than
either competent criminal defendants or non-criminal incompetents); Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56 (1972) (poor denied access to courts by requirement of double bond to appeal forcible
entry and detainer decision); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (poor denied equal
opportunity to exercise right of statutory appeal without adequate trial record); (2) access to
the ballot; see Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (more
stringent petition requirements deny minor party candidates access to the ballot); American
Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (minor party candidates' names left off absentee
ballot); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (poor denied access to ballot by high filing fees);
(3) equal representation and voting rights; see Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977) (differently
sized voting districts dilute voting strengths of blacks); O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974)
(denial of absentee ballot to misdemeanor convicts and detainees if incarcerated in county
residence); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (dilution of voting strength of blacks and
Mexican-Americans); (4) the right to travel; see Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974) (one year durational residency requirement for indigent services at county hospital); -
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one year durational residency requirement for voting);
(5) marriage/privacy rights; see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (fathers not paying
child support denied right to remarry); and (6) first amendment rights; see Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455 (1980) (denial of picketing rights near private residences to only some groups
denies equal protection); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (denial of picketing
rights near private residences to particular groups denies equal protection).
13. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); accord Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969).
14. A quasi-suspect classification is one that discriminates against a group which shares
certain "indicia of suspectness" with inherently suspect classes. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976). The presumption under heightened scrutiny is that a statute must be reasonably
related to a substantial state interest. This form of review was proposed in Professor Gunther's
groundbreaking work. See supra note 8.
Some suspect characteristics assessed under heightened scrutiny include: (1) immutable traits;
see Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin); (2) social disabilities; see Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indigency); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (illegitimacy); (3) a
history of unequal treatment; see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
19851
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teristics with inherently suspect classifications, but the Court recognizes that
a substantial state interest often justifies classification along such lines. As
a result, the presumption of unconstitutionality is not as strong as that
associated with strict scrutiny. Under heightened scrutiny, the Court requires
a substantial, rather than compelling, state interest to which the classification
must be substantially related.'
Classifications that are not drawn on suspect lines and do not adversely
impact on fundamental rights are presumed to be constitutional.' These
classifications need only meet the minimum rationality test which requires
that a legislature be rationally capable of believing that the classification
used will further some legitimate state interest. 7 The Court has been ex-
tremely deferential to legislatures when applying this standard-even to the
point of suggesting legitimate state purposes where none could be found in
the statutory text, the legislative history or previous judicial proceedings. "
As applied, the minimum rationality test has most often meant no review at
all. '
9
Against this background, the Supreme Court took the startling step of
striking down the application of four state laws under the heretofore ex-
tremely deferential minimum rationality test.20 The challenged statutes in
each of these cases dealt with either taxation or zoning,' areas in which
dissenting) ($500 property tax exemption for widows, but not widowers); (4) unpopularity of
trait or affiliation; see New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (drug
usage); (5) identifiability of group membership; see United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (unrelated persons living together).
15. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
16. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 181 (1973); Western & Southern Life Ins. Co.
v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668 (1981); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 303 (1976).
17. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668. For a
discussion of the development of the minimum rationality test, see Shaman, supra note 7, at
162.
18. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) ("the legislature might
have concluded . . . a prescription is necessary . . . a written prescription may or may not be
necessary. But the legislature might have concluded that one was needed .... Or the legislature
may have concluded...") (emphasis added).
19. Under the Warren Court, and until this past term, minimum rationality review was
inevitably "minimum scrutiny in theory and virtually [nonexistentl in fact." Gunther, supra
note 8, at 8.
20. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (special use permit
to operate home for the mentally handicapped not rationally related to state purpose as applied
to plaintiffs); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985) (tax credits for
Vietnam veterans taking up residence in the state only before May 6, 1976, not rationally
related to any legitimate purpose); Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465 (1985) (tax credit for
residents who paid auto sales tax in another state, but only if a resident at time of purchase,
not rationally related to purpose of collecting revenue for maintenance of state highway system);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985) (promotion of domestic industry
not a legitimate purpose when furthered by discriminatory tax against nonresidents).
21. Cleburne involved a zoning statute; the other three cases involved tax statutes. See supra
note 20.
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legislatures had previously enjoyed the utmost leeway in classification. 22
Paradoxically, this apparent break with precedent was undertaken with an
almost dogmatic adherence to previous theoretical formulations. 23 Justices
have referred to this use of the minimum rationality test as "scrutiny that
is neither minimal nor strict, but strange unto itself"24 and accused the Court
of "provid~ing] no principled foundation for determining when more search-
ing inquiry is to be invoked, [leaving lower] courts . . . in the dark . . . and
this Court . . . unaccountable for its decisions. ''25
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,26 the final equal protection
decision of the 1984 Term, the Court unanimously2 7 struck down a zoning
statute as applied to a group of mentally retarded persons. However, there
was no agreement among several factions on the Court about the principles
that should inform review of laws under the equal protection clause. 2 This
. 22. See, e.g., Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648
(1981) (retaliatory tax should be sustained if rationally related to a legitimate state purpose);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (governmental purpose of protecting its citizens
through zoning long recognized as legitimate). Accord Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. I (1974) (zoning); Lehnausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 410 U.S. 356 (1973) (taxation);
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (zoning); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers,
358 U.S. 522 (1959) (taxation); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) (taxation); Carmichael
v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937) (taxation).
23. In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985), the Court adhered to
the traditional formula that a tax classification must be rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose. The Court held, however, that promotion of domestic industry was not a legitimate
state purpose when furthered by tax discrimination against nonresidents. Id. at 1684. But see
Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981) (promotion
of state industry is a legitimate state interest). In Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 105
S. Ct. 2862 (1985), the Court held that it was not rational to reward with a $2000 property tax
exemption only those veterans who had resided in the state prior to May 8, 1976, while denying
such benefits to those veterans who moved to the state after that date. Id. at 2868-69. In
Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465 (1985), the Court held unconstitutional a state statute
that gave credits to state residents for out-of-state sales taxes paid on automobiles, but deprived
credits to residents who moved into the state after they bought the car.
24. Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465, 2476 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3265 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring and dissenting).
26. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
27. All of the justices agreed that the zoning ordinance in question was invalid as applied
to the plaintiffs. Id. at 3260. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun would have invalidated
the ordinance on its face. Id. at 3263 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
28. The decision was announced in three opinions. The majority opinion, written by Justice
White and joined by all except Justices Marshall and Blackmun, applied the traditional three-
tiered analysis. See infra notes 113-34 and accompanying text. A separate concurring opinion,
written by Justice Stevens and joined by Chief Justice Burger, proposed that all equal protection
cases should be reviewed under a single rational relationship standard. See infra notes 135-44
and accompanying text. A concurring and dissenting opinion, written by Justice Marshall and
joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, proposed that the class of the mentally ill should
be considered quasi-suspect and reviewed under a heightened scrutiny balancing test. See infra
notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
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Note reviews the Cleburne decision and the theories of equal protection
analysis espoused by the separate opinions in the case. The Note further
demonstrates that any successful equal protection challenge to legislation
ultimately involves the balancing of governmental and individual interests
customarily associated with heightened scrutiny-regardless of whether the
Court labels its review strict, heightened or minimal. Finally, the Note will
show that there are two common features present in all successful equal
protection challenges: (1) that the Court only invalidates laws under the
equal protection clause where there is a serious harm; and (2) that the
challenging class inevitably possesses one or more characteristic commonly
associated with inherently suspect classes. This Note will refer to such
characteristics as "suspect characteristics." Following these conclusions, this
Note concludes that equal protection analysis should be recast to provide
substantive review only for legislation shown to be the result of prejudicial,
stereotyped or thoughtless exploitation of the suspect characteristics of a
class, and to invalidate such legislation where the state interests at stake do
not outweigh the injury to the defendant class.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
A. Pre-Burger Court Development
Five years after ratification of the fourteenth amendment 9 the Supreme
Court declared that it could not foresee application of the equal protection
clause to cases other than state discrimination against a disadvantaged racial
minority. 0 By inference, if not by actual application, the Court quickly
retreated from that position and heard case after case in which white and
corporate defendants were involved in equal protection disputes with state
governments that had nothing to do with racial discrimination.', Despite the
Court's willingness to hear these claims, the Court's deference to classifi-
cations drawn by state legislatures was so complete as to give the clause
almost no effect in non-racial cases. 2 Not until 1897, in Gulf, Colorado &
29. The fourteenth amendment became law on July 28, 1868. U.S. CoNsT. art. XIV.
30. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
31. See Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888) (challenge of privilege
tax assessed against out-of-state corporations); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887) (greater
number of peremptory juror challenges allotted to residents of particular counties in state);
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885) (harsher tort damages assessed against
defendant railroads than other classes of defendants); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885)
(particular businesses required to cease operation at night); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22
(1879) (appeal to state supreme court allowed for residents of some counties but not for others).
32. In Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885), the Court held that states
had complete authority to classify people to receive benefits and burdens as long as all those
who were classified together received the same treatment. In other words, states could discrim-
inate against whomever they pleased, so long as they created a legislative classification for those
against whom they wished to discriminate.
[Vol. 35:485
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Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Ellis," did the Court invalidate non-racial legislation
on equal protection grounds.' " The Court's formulation of equal protection
in Ellis is a readily identifiable forerunner of the modern construction of
the clause." Under Ellis, classifications are upheld if they are based on
grounds that bear a "reasonable and just" relation to the classification.16
Prior to the Burger Court, equal protection cases were reviewed under
two tiers of scrutiny: strict scrutiny 7 and minimum rationality.18 Classifica-
tions drawn along lines of race or national origin, or which affected enjoy-
ment of fundamental rights, underwent strict scrutiny. 9 All legislation not
subject to strict scrutiny needed only to pass the minimum rationality test.4"
B. Developments in the Burger Court
The Burger Court expanded equal protection analysis by creating an
intermediate level of review for classifications based on gender 4 and illegi-
timacy.42 Initially, this "heightened scrutiny" took place under the pretense
33. 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
34. Id. The Court invalidated a Texas statute that required railroads to pay attorneys fees
to prevailing creditor plaintiffs, while other debtor corporations did not pay fees.
35. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
36. 165 U.S. at 155.
37. See supra note 8.
38. See supra note 10.
39. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (fundamental rights); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1969) (race); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (national origin).
40. See supra note 10.
41. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (state nursing school that
admitted only women students violates equal protection); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455
(1981) (statute that gave husband unilateral right to dispose of community property without
wife's consent violates equal protection); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142
(1980) (workers compensation laws giving different benefits to surviving male and female spouses
violates equal protection clause); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (welfare benefits
based on unemployment of father, but not mother, denies equal protection); Zaban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (treating unmarried parents differently based only on gender
denies equal protection); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (differing survivor benefits
based on gender violates equal protection); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (different legal
drinking age based on gender denies equal protection); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (basing dependent benefits on gender denies equal protection); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971) (giving preference to men over women in appointment as estate administrator denies
equal protection).
42. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. I (1983) (two-year statute of limitations on paternity suits
violates equal protection); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (statute allowing illegitimate
children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers denies equal protection);
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (more onerous requirements for illegitimate children
than legitimate children to receive social security benefits denies equal protection); New Jersey
Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (limiting welfare assistance to families with
legitimate children denies equal protection); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (basing right
to paternal support on legitimacy violates equal protection); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (basing workers compensation benefits on the legitimacy of dependent
1985]
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of minimum rationality, 4 but it was soon recognized as a separate level of
review. 44 The Burger Court continues to assert that wide latitude is given to
legislative classifications subjected to minimum rationality review.4 5 However,
the Court has recently departed from this position often enough to raise
doubts about the principles which actually guide the Court's decisions.
In order to elicit some pattern from the Burger Court's decisions, this
Note will discuss the levels of review that the Court uses as they relate to
the factual situations which "trigger" these different levels of scrutiny. The
Cleburne opinion suggests three factual situations which trigger a level of
review higher than minimum rationality in equal protection cases: (1) the
use of classifications that are inherently suspect,4 6 (2) the use of classifications
that impair fundamental rights," and (3) the use of classifications that are
"quasi-suspect." '4 This Note will examine Burger Court equal protection
decisions under these three headings. Additionally, an examination of equal
protection challenges which have been upheld under the minimum rationality
test will show that a common factual basis exists for these cases as well.
1. Inherently Suspect Classifications
The Burger Court has consistently claimed that the primary focus of the
equal protection clause is to protect against racial discrimination." It has
also held that other classifications, such as those based on national origin
and alienage, are equally irrelevant to legitimate governmental objectives and
therefore inherently suspect." ' The Court has continued to find that legislation
which classifies along these lines should undergo strict scrutiny.' Neverthe-
less, because of developments in civil rights law, such scrutiny is no longer
children denies equal protection). The Warren Court did invalidate some illegitimacy classifi-
cations. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (striking exclusion of illegitimate children
from wrongful death action). However, it was the Burger Court that introduced intermediate
review.
43. See Gunther, supra note 8, at 18-19.
44. See Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255.
45. Compare Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3254-55 ("[wlhen social or economic legislation is at
issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the states wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes
that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes") with
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) ("our decisions presume the consti-
tutionality of the statutory discrimination").
46. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255 ("race, alienage land] national origin ... are so seldom
relevant ... [that they] are subjected to strict scrutiny").
47. Id. ("[strict scrutiny] by the courts is due when state laws impinge on personal rights
protected by the Constitution").
48. Id. ("Illegislative classifications based on gender ... [and] illegitimacy ... are also
subject to somewhat heightened review").
49. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 (1978).
50. Id. at 292-93.
51. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3254-55.
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"fatal in fact." 52 The Court is willing to apply a balancing test to classifi-
cations that foster de facto discrimination." The Court also accepts affirm-
ative action as a constitutional remedy for past, intentional discrimination. 4
Finally, although the Court originally treated alienage classifications under
strict scrutiny, -5 the level of review in these cases is now contingent upon
the type of governmental activity involved.16 Strict scrutiny, while still de-
manding a substantial relationship to a compelling state interest, is not as
strict as it was under the Warren Court and is often indistinguishable from
heightened scrutiny.5'
52. Gunther, supra note 8, at 8.
53. De facto discrimination is exhibited when there is a disparate impact on a suspect class,
despite a facially neutral classification. Such classifications will be invalidated only if there is
a showing of invidious discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976). Some of the factors to be weighed are stated in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp.: (1) discriminatory impact; (2) specific sequence of events leading to
decision; (3) substantive departures from normal procedures; and (4) legislative and adminis-
trative history. 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977). See also Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens
Rea: Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. I11 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Discriminatory Purpose] (equates the Court's current intent requirement with criminal
standard of specific intent, and argues for a lower level of intent, such as knowledge).
54. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (racial classification will be upheld if
based on congressional attempt to remedy present effects of past discrimination); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (remedying effects of past official discrimination
may only be undertaken upon a finding of such discrimination by a competent governmental
body); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (dilution of Jewish
voting strength not a denial of equal protection where redistricting plan was drawn with purpose
of preserving black voting strength).
55. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (states may not impose United
States citizenship requirements on receipt of welfare payments). Alienage classifications had
been invalidated by earlier Courts. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948) (law that barred aliens from buying fishing licenses unconstitutional). See also Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discriminatory administration against aliens of facially neutral
statute). The Burger Court was the first to apply strict scrutiny to alienage classifications.
Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 ("[alliens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
minority . . . for whom .. .heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate").
56. Alienage classifications in the economic and social realm continue to receive strict
scrutiny, but the government may regulate alien participation in political and policy-making
functions. See Bernal v. Fainter, 104 S. Ct. 2312, 2317 (1984) ("[wle have ... lowered our
standard of review when evaluating the validity of exclusions that entrust only to citizens
important elective and nonelective positions whose operations 'go to the heart of representative
government' "); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (state may, consistent with equal
protection, deprive aliens of employment as parole officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68
(1979) (state may deprive alien of certification as public school teacher); Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291 (1978) (state may require state police officers to be United States citizens).
57. Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 Sup.
CT. REV. 167, 193 (argues that there is only one tier of judicial scrutiny that balances all
competing interests). That the Court actually applies only one test balancing all of the relevant
factors has been recognized by at least two of the justices. See Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3260-
61 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 3260 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). The factors
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2. Quasi-suspect Classifications
In terms of equal protection analysis, the Burger Court is most closely
identified with the creation of an intermediate level of review for quasi-
suspect classifications. 8 The Court gives quasi-suspect classifications height-
ened scrutiny, which requires that any such classification be substantially
related to an important state interest.59 Heightened scrutiny affords the Court
the opportunity to subject legislative classifications to a more rigorous review,
while still allowing states the opportunity to justify the classification. 60
The Court has granted quasi-suspect status to gender and illegitimacy
classifications because these groups share certain characteristics with classes
considered inherently suspect. 6' These characteristics, or "indicia of sus-
pectness," 62 include immutable traits,"3 social disabilities," a history of un-
equal treatment, - absolute or relative political impotence, 6 unpopularity of
to consider include the nature of the class, the governmental interest, and the nature of the
injury or right affected. Id. at 3261-62 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 3265 (Marshall, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
58. See supra note 14.
59. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
60. See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1082-89.
61. See, e.g., Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (illegitimacy, like race or national
origin, is a characteristic beyond the control of the individual and bears no relation to the
individual's ability to function in society); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973)
(gender classifications are similar to race, alienage and national origin because there is a long
history of discrimination, presence of immutable traits, and irrelevant stereotyping).
62. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973).
63. Id. Immutable traits include race, gender, and mental retardation. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct.
at 3256. One commentator has suggested that other types of conditions might be considered
immutable. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 723, 730 n.36 (1974) ("many characteristics that are theoretically changeable are not
practically so; distinctions of Constitutional magnitude should not partake of the pretense that
any poor working man can significantly change his lot in life . .. if he will only shape up ...
Must a trait be 'congenital' in order to be 'unalterable'?").
64. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Such disabilities
include poverty, lack of education and language ability.
65. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973). See also Cleburne, 105 S. Ct.
at 3268-69 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting) (mentally handicapped are politically
impotent, despite recent public initiatives in their behalf). But see id. at 3257 (legislative response
on behalf of the mentally handicapped negates any claim that they are politically impotent).
Political impotence is often the major focus of any equal protection claim for status as a
suspect group. The most frequently cited authority for that proposition is United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Compare id. ("a special condition
... which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities . . .may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry") with Heckler v. Matthews, 104 S. Ct. 1387, 1395 (1984) ("we have repeatedly
emphasized [that] discrimination itself, . . . stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as
'innately inferior' and therefore as less worthy participants in the political community can cause
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trait or affiliation,"7 and identifiability of group membership .6  The devel-
opment of quasi-suspect status has led to challenges of legislation that
classified people on the basis of poverty,69 obesity,7" residence, 7 length of
residence, 2 mental handicap,73 matrimonial status 74 physical handicap,"
age7 6 and sexual preference. 7  Nonetheless, the Court has refused to grant
quasi-suspect status to classifications other than gender and illegitimacy,
despite the urgings of several commentators.7 1
serious non-economic injur[y]"). Many commentators feel that such a breakdown of the normal
political processes should be the sole focal point of judicial review. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 181 (1980) (judicial review should concern itself
only with questions of participation, not with the substantive merits of the political choice).
Others believe the Court should take a more active role in the review of legislation. See, e.g.,
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063,
1086 (1980) (Constitution cannot be understood in the absence of a theory of fundamental
rights based on substantive choices). For a discussion of both sides of the issue, see Nichol,
Giving Substance its Due, 93 YALE L.J. 171 (1983); Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the
Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89 (1984);
Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
67. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979) (drug users); United
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (hippies).
68. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1973). See also Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (separate educational facilities stigmatize the
segregated minority).
69. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (school financing
scheme resulting in higher per capita spending in "rich" school districts than in "poor" ones
does not deny equal protection).
70. Vance v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Tex.) (regulations that provided for
discipline and discharge of overweight service personnel without reference to job performance
does not deny equal protection), aff'd, 565 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1977).
71. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981) (higher
tax for foreign than domestic insurance companies does not violate equal protection).
72. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985) (Court declined to grant
heightened scrutiny to new residence classification but invalidated statute under minimum
rationality test).
73. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) (mentally handicapped not a suspect class).
74. Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1982) (higher filing fees for marital dispute
cases than for other actions does not deny equal protection).
75. In re Kirschner, 74 Misc. 2d 20, 344 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1973) (requiring state to bear
reasonable cost of public education for handicapped children).
76. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (mandatory retirement at age sixty for foreign
service employees does not violate equal protection); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976) (mandatory retirement of uniformed state police at age fifty does not deny
equal protection).
77. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984) (statute
providing for dismissal of teachers for engaging in public homosexual acts does not deny equal
protection), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985).
78. Commentators have suggested that quasi-suspect status be granted to a variety of
classifications. See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1077-82 (age); McCoy, Recent Equal Protection
Decisions-Fundamental Right to Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class? 28 VAND. L.
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3. Fundamental Rights
Theoretically, statutes that affect fundamental rights receive strict scru-
tiny.7 9 A review of Burger Court decisions in this area, however, reveals two
striking features. First, although those challenges which were successful were
not always brought by members of classes considered inherently or quasi-
suspect, the challenging class inevitably exhibits "indicia of suspectness" (or
suspect characteristics). 0 Second, the level of review in such cases has not
always risen to strict scrutiny." The fact that successful fundamental rights
REV. 987 (1975); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a
Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1285 (1985); Comment, Constitutional Law-Right
to Travel-Equal Protection--Durational Residency Requirements-Zobel v. Williams, 29 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REV. 829 (1985); Comment, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (1984);
Note, The Constitutional Right of Bilingual Children to an Equal Educational Opportunity, 47
S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 979-85 (1974); Note, Equal Protection and Intelligence Classifications, 26
STAN. L. REV. 647 (1974); Note, Intermediate Equal Protection Scrutiny of Welfare Laws that
Deny Subsistence, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1547 (1984); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classifi-
cation? 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974).
79. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255 (1985); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976).
80. Successful challenges have been brought by several groups: (I) blacks; see Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Police Dep't
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); (2) the poor; see Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709
(1974); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U.S.
128 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189
(1971); (3) the mentally ill; see Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady,
405 U.S. 504 (1972); (4) criminal defendants; see O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974);
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v.
Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); (5) political minorities and dissidents; see Illinois Elections Bd. v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S.
767 (1974); and (6) new state residents or nonresidents; see Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Some of these challenges
were brought by groups fitting more than one of these categories. Race, of course, has been
held to be inherently suspect. The other classes listed above each exhibit suspect characteristics.
The poor possess social disabilities, a history of unequal treatment, relative political impotence,
and an unpopular trait. It has been suggested that their condition could also be considered
immutable. See Ely, supra note 63, at 730 n.36. The mentally ill are saddled with an immutable
trait, social disabilities, a history of unequal treatment, political impotence and an unpopular
trait. Criminal defendants belong to an unpopular and identifiable class and can be said to
have a history of unequal treatment. By definition, political minorities also belong to an
unpopular class, have histories of unequal treatment, and are the object of special constitutional
protections such as the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly. New and nonresidents
suffer from absolute or relative political impotence. Nonresidents in particular have historically
received unequal treatment and have been the object of special constitutional protections.
81. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (close connection
between assessment of fees and use of water justifies limiting voting for water district board
to landowners on basis of acreage owned). Accord Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party,
457 U.S. 1 (1982) (choosing replacement for retired public representative by appointment and
not election justified as politically expedient and causing only de minimis injury); Estelle v.
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cases were invariably brought by groups with suspect characteristics suggests
that the Court is highly concerned with the nature of the disadvantaged class
as well as with the seriousness of the injury or the nature of the right.12
Other challenges brought by these same disadvantaged groups have failed.x3
This evidences that the Court is willing to balance the alleged "fundamental"
injury against the state interest-a method of review associated with height-
ened, rather than strict, scrutiny.
Additionally, the Court's review of fundamental rights claims has varied
based on the presence of suspect characteristics. Many fundamental rights
Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975) (denial of statutory appeal in prison escape cases justified by
state interests in deterring escapes and promoting surrender); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315
(1973) (preserving traditional political subdivisions is important state purpose justifying 16.4%
deviation in relative voting strength).
82. If the Court were concerned only with whether a fundamental right had been impaired,
then there should be cases striking statutes that impair rights even though the affected classes
had no suspect characteristics. Moreover, per se impairment of fundamental rights would
constitute a due process violation. As an example, Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972), was an equal protection case rather than a due process or first amendment
case. In Mosley, the city of Chicago had banned all picketing within 150 feet of schools but
had exempted labor picketing. Because the city could have banned all picketing within a limited
and specified area without violating due process or the first amendment, the ordinance could
not be invalidated on those grounds. Rather, favoring one type of speech (labor dissent) and
creating a disfavored class of speech (other dissent) violated equal protection. In this case, the
seriousness of the right affected (free speech) was sufficient to create an equal rights violation
even when coupled with a class (dissenters) with only limited suspect characteristics. Although
the plaintiffs in this case happened to be black, the ordinance was facially neutral as to race
and discriminated only against disfavored dissent.
83. Such unsuccessful challenges have been brought by several suspect groups: (1) the poor;
see Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569 (1982) (Congress may differentiate between different
categories of poor in benefit programs); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (states need not
pay for certain medically necessary abortions not funded by the federal government); Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (states may decline to fund non-therapeutic abortions); Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (state need not fund discretionary criminal appeals); San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (no right to equal funding of public
schools); (2) the mentally ill; see Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (Congress may
provide benefits for medically needy without including all possible groups); (3) criminal defend-
ants; see Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975) (state may rescind escapees' right to appeal
conviction); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974) (Congress may decline to provide
rehabilitative treatment for chronic repeat offenders); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973)
(state may deny application of good time credit for pre-sentence incarceration period); (4)
political minorities and dissenters; see American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974)
(state may have different ballot qualification proceedings for parties of differing size); Storer
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (state may bar major political party members from running for
office as independent or new party candidates within six months of resignation from party);
and (5) nonresidents of state; see Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 105 S. Ct. 2545
(1985) (state may exclude out-of-state banks from doing business within the state); Jones v.
Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981) (state may impose higher penalty on criminal defendants who leave
the state than those who do not); Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization,
451 U.S. 648 (1981) (state may tax foreign insurance companies at a higher rate through
retaliatory tax).
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challenges have been brought by groups that do not possess any suspect
characteristics. While such challenges were often based on the impairment
of the same rights as those successfully alleged by groups with suspect
characteristics, challenges brought by groups without suspect characteristics
have not been successful.14 The Court's refusal to uphold those challenges
suggests that the presence of some suspect characteristics in a plaintiff class
is an essential element in any successful equal protection challenge. 5
4. Minimum Rationality
The Burger Court continues to maintain the position that classifications
which do not classify along suspect lines or impair fundamental rights will
be upheld unless there is absolutely no rational basis to defend them. "6 From
1971 through 1984, only three statutes were invalidated without reference to
strict or heightened scrutiny. "7 However, during the 1984 Term, the Court
upheld four equal protection challenges under the minimum rationality test.,8
Taken together, these seven decisions illustrate the failure of the three-tiered
system.8 9 Traditionally, the Court invalidates statutes under the minimum
84. See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983) (89% maximum deviation of legislative
district population upheld since there was no evidence of racial or other improper discrimina-
tion); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982) (law that prevented current officeholders from
running for new offices during their term upheld); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (denial
of voting rights to tenant farmers upheld); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978) (more
severe sentences for murder defendants who exercised their right to trial upheld).
85. Cf. Dallas County v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477, 480 (1975) ("A successful attack . . . must
be based on findings ... that a plan in fact operates impermissibly to dilute the voting strength
of an identifiable element of the voting population"). Compare Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S.
835 (1983) (89% maximum deviation from median voting representation held not to violate
rights of residents of larger counties) with Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977) (19.3%
maximum deviation held to violate rights of districts with large black populations).
86. Cf. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72
(1981) (equal protection clause is satisfied if a legislature rationally could have believed that
the statute would promote its objective); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 466 (1981) (legislatures need not remedy all ills at once, or in the same way, but may
remedy them step-by-step). Accord Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); Regan v.
Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S.
93 (1979).
87. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (denial of free education to children of illegal
aliens violates equal protection); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (distributing tax rebates
progressively on the basis of length of residence violates equal protection); United States Dep't
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (statute passed specifically to deny food stamps
to hippies violates equal protection).
88. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 105 S. Ct.
2862 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward,
105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985). See supra notes 20 & 23.
89. These are the aberrant cases, in which the Court found equal protection violations
without resort to the conventional avenues of invalidation of strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny,
or fundamental rights. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (zoning); Hooper v. Bernalillo County
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rationality test only where there is no rational basis for the classification
whatsoever.' However, none of the challenged statutes in these cases were
totally irrational or devoid of legitimate purpose. 91 In these cases, the Court
seems to have confused the requirement of rationality, which is associated
with the minimum rationality test, with the requirement of substantial rele-
vance, which is associated with heightened and strict scrutiny.92
Assessor, 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985) (property taxes); Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465 (1985)
(sales tax rebates); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985) (corporate
taxes); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (education); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982)
(state revenue disbursements); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973) (food stamp benefits). Only in Plyler did the plaintiffs argue that the affected right was
fundamental. 457 U.S. at 230 (Marshall, J., concurring).
The traits of the challenging groups varied. Moreno, Zobel, Hooper, and Williams dealt
with new state residents. Metropolitan Life involved the rights of foreign corporations. Cleburne
assessed the rights of the mentally handicapped. None of these groups have ever been held to
be inherently or quasi-suspect. Although the Court has invoked the "right to travel" as a
fundamental right in the past, as in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (challenging
residency requirements for welfare benefits), it did not raise that "right" in Zobel, Hooper, or
Williams. The Court apparently recognized that the challenged statutes in these cases did not
actually discourage interstate travel.
90. See supra note 10.
91. Of the three statutes involved, only the statute in Moreno could be said to have had an
illegitimate purpose, because the statute was aimed specifically at depriving an unpopular group
(hippies) of a governmenj benefit (food stamps). The statute purportedly related to other
governmental interests, such as cost, administrative efficiency and minimizing fraud. 413 U.S.
at 535. The other statutes were designed for other purposes. Hooper v. Bernalillo County
Assessor, 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985) (to reward resident veterans, state provides present residents
with tax credits); Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465 (to finance highway maintenance, state
collects sales and use tax on the automobiles of new residents); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985) (to promote local insurance industry, state taxes foreign companies
for doing business in the state); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (to preserve the state's
resources for lawful residents and ensure the quality of education, state limits school attendance
to legal residents); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (to reward Alaska citizens for past
contributions to the state, state distributes progressively higher tax rebates based on years of
residency).
92. Rationality relates to a hypothesized perception of a legislature that a classification will
advance a permissible state goal. See, e.g., Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668 (1981) (minimum rationality test looks only at whether legislature
could rationally believe that a classification would serve a legitimate governmental interest).
Relevancy, on the other hand, looks at how closely the classification serves the asserted state
interest in fact. Traditionally, it is only under strict or heightened scrutiny that the Court
requires a close fit. See Comment, Suspect Classifications: A Suspect Analysis, 87 DICK. L.
REV. 407, 437-39 (1983) (comparing the function of rationality and relevancy in equal protection
analysis). For example, in Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465 (1985), the Court looked at
how well the statute accomplished its goals (relevancy) rather than at whether the legislature
could have believed that it would do so (rationality). In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward,
105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985), the Court refused to focus on the legislature's belief that the classification
used would further the state's goals. It focused instead on the nature of the classification. In
both of these cases the method of analysis is associated with heightened scrutiny rather than
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On first impression, the Court's higher scrutiny of non-suspect classifi-
cations signals a more substantive review of legislative goals and methods
than the Court has undertaken in the past. However, a careful examination
of the recent decisions reveals that each of these suits was brought by a class
with suspect characteristics. 9 Moreover, in some of these cases, the Court
expressly objected to the nature of the classifications used by legislatures
rather than to the asserted legislative goals or methods.94 This focus on the
nature of the classification and insistence on a substantial degee of relevancy
is actually heightened scrutiny. 95 However, the Court chose to phrase its
decisions in minimum rationality language rather than redefine the factual
basis necessary to trigger heightened scrutiny.
C. Summary
Close examination of Burger Court decisions shows that the Supreme
Court does not actually use a three-tiered system of review. To the contrary,
the Court applies only two levels of review.96 To warrant overturning a
statute, though, the Court requires at a minimum that the statutory classi-
fication hurt some group with some suspect characteristics. 97 If the classifi-
cation affects no such groups, then the Court applies its traditional minimum
minimum rationality.
In the past, the Court has not been concerned with the relevancy of non-suspect classifications
unless they were found to be totally irrelevant. Where that has been the case, the Court has
held that such classifications violated the due process clause. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (arbitrarily foreclosing review of employment disputes after
certain time period violates due process). See also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (equal
protection is component of fifth amendment due process clause, applied against federal gov-
ernment).
93. Four cases dealt with residency requirements, which tend to exploit a politically weak
group of outsiders. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985); Williams v.
Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985);
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). Plyler v. Doe dealt with illegal alien children, a group
that has social disabilities, a history of discrimination, political impotence and unpopularity of
trait. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The hippies in United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno were
a politically unpopular group. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
94. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676, 1684 (1985) (promotion of
domestic business is not a legitimate state purpose when furthered by discriminating against
non-residents) (emphasis added); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 105 S. Ct. 2862, 2869
(1985) ("Itlhe New Mexico statute creates . . . second-class citizens").
95. Heightened scrutiny demands substantial relevance. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976). Minimum rationality requires only that a legislature be rationally capable of believing
that a classification is relevant to the state's goals. See supra note 92 (how 1985 equal protection
cases treat relationship of relevance and rationality).
96. See supra note 57 (scrutiny of inherently suspect classifications more akin to heightened
scrutiny), 79-85 (scrutiny of fundamental rights challenges actually in form of heightened
scrutiny), & 86-95 (successful minimum rationality challenges actually receive heightened scru-
tiny).
97. See supra notes 79-85 (fundamental rights) & 86-95 (minimum rationality).
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rationality test. If such groups are hurt by a state classification, then the
Court applies a form of heightened scrutiny. Under that test, the Court
balances the relevance of the proposed classification, the seriousness of the
injury to the class, and the state's interest in the legislative scheme.
III. CITY OF CLEBURNE V. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER
A. Facts and Procedures
A zoning ordinance in effect in Cleburne, Texas, during 1980 ordered
operators of special facilities for the mentally retarded to obtain a special
use permit from the city council before locating a facility in an area zoned
R-3.1 Although multiple occupancy units were permitted in R-3 zones,99
special facilities including "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded"
needed the annual renewable permit.11 Cleburne Living Center (CLC) planned
to establish a home for mentally retarded adults and registered for the
appropriate permit.' The city council denied the permit, ostensibly prompted
by a concern for the attitudes of adjacent property owners, the proposed
facility's proximity to a junior high school, its location on a five-hundred-
year flood plain, and the number of potential occupants. Finally, the council
concluded that CLC would contribute inordinately to the community's pop-
ulation density and street congestion.102
CLC sued the city in federal district court, claiming that the zoning
ordinance denied them equal protection. 0 The district court found that there
were no fundamental rights at stake and that mental retardation did not
constitute a quasi-suspect class. Accordingly, the court applied the minimum
rationality test to the ordinance and held that the ordinance was rationally
related to the city's interests. M The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court. It found that the mentally retarded were, and
are, characterized by a history of oppression, political impotence and an
immutable condition.'"' The court held that classifications based on mental
retardation are quasi-suspect and subject to heightened scrutiny.1 The court
of appeals concluded that the ordinance was not substantially related to an
98. 105 S. Ct. 3248 (1985).
99. These units included apartment houses, dormitories, fraternity and sorority houses,
apartment hotels, hospitals, sanitariums and various types of nursing homes. Id. at 3252-53.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 3252.
102. Id. at 3260.
103. The district court's opinion was not reported. See Cleburne Living Center v. City of
Cleburne, No. CA 3-80-1676-F (N.D. Tex. April 16, 1982).
104. 105 S. Ct. at 3253. The city's interests were CLC's legal responsibilities, the safety and
fears of neighbors, and the number of potential occupants.
105. 726 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1984).
106. Id. at 198.
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important governmental interest and that it was therefore facially unconsti-
tutional. "I"
On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the ordinance was
unconstitutional, but only as applied to CLC.'18 The Court also held, by a
6-3 vote, that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification and
does not merit heightened scrutiny. The Court found, however, that the
ordinance failed the minimum rationality test." Justice Marshall, joined by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, argued that classifications based on mental
retardation deserve heightened scrutiny and that the ordinance was facially
invalid.'10 Although six Justices agreed that mental retardation should not
receive heightened scrutiny, only four agreed fully with the majority's rea-
soning. In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by the Chief Justice,
rejected the Court's three-tiered method of analysis."' In view of these
separate opinions, the majority opinion expressed only a plurality view on
the appropriate method of equal protection review." 2
B. The Opinions in Cleburne
Each opinion in Cleburne exhibits a different approach to equal protection
analysis. Justice White's majority opinion reviews the city's actions by the
traditional three-tiered approach. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion pro-
poses a "rational basis" test for all equal protection cases, by which he
would review state classifications sui generis to test their rationality. Finally,
Justice Marshall's concurring opinion proposes a balancing test, which ac-
cords a progressively more rigorous review to classifications that affect
groups with greater suspect characteristics.
1. Majority Opinion of Justice White
Justice White's majority opinion followed the traditional three-tiered ap-
proach to equal protection." 3 He recognized that mental retardation is
immutable. However, he cited immutability as a reason for denying quasi-
suspect status, because immutability is relevant to many classifications which
are designed to benefit or protect the mentally retarded.' '4 Justice White
107. Id. at 200.
108. 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
109. Id. at 3255-56.
110. Id. at 3262 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
Ill. Id. at 3260 (Stevens, J., concurring).
112. Only four justices accepted the three-tiered system of equal protection analysis without
reservation: Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
113. The opinion held that racial, ethnic and alienage classifications and infringements on
fundamental rights should receive strict scrutiny; that gender and illegitimacy classifications
should receive heightened scrutiny; and that all other legislative classifications need be only
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3254-55.
114. Id. at 3256.
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glossed over the history of oppression against the mentally retarded' 5 and
stated that recent legislative concern for their plight negated any claim of
political impotence."16 Against this background, he held that mental retar-
dation was not a quasi-suspect classification that required heightened scru-
tiny.
Justice White appeared more troubled by the ramifications of granting
quasi-suspect status to the mentally retarded than by the possibility of
legislative animosity against them. He made three arguments against quasi-
suspect status for the mentally retarded: (1) that it would engross the courts
in legislative-type decisions about the mentally handicapped;" 7 (2) that a
high level of judicial scrutiny would hinder legislative aid to the mentally
retarded; 118 and (3) that expanding quasi-suspect status beyond gender and
illegitimacy to the mentally retarded would create a demand for like treatment
from a myriad of other groups." 9 Nevertheless, Justice White found enough
"bite" in the minimum rationality tier of equal protection to invalidate the
ordinance as applied to CLC. 2 In doing so, he examined the city's purposes
behind the ordinance and the relevance of the classification to those purposes,
rather than whether the city council could have rationally believed that the
classification would promote some legitimate goal.' 2'
115. Id. at 3258. But see id. at 3262 (Stevens, J., concurring) (court of appeals correctly
observed that mentally handicapped have a history of unfair and grotesque mistreatment). See
also id. at 3266-67 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discusses historical treatment of the mentally
retarded in the United States).
116. Id. at 3257.
117. Id. at 3255. The Court declared that heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive
judgments about legislative decisions. Id. at 3256. In fact, the opposite is true. Presumptions
of invalidity under strict and heightened scrutiny encourage automatic invalidation on a means-
focused basis, rather than on a more substantive ends-focused basis. It is when the Court
substitutes its own judgment about the best means of achieving state goals, or about what those
goals should be, that the Court renders a substantive judicial decision. See Cox, The Role of
the Supreme Court in American Society, 50 MARQ. L. REv. 575, 584 (1967) (when courts weigh
and balance the interests behind a statute, they make personal judgments about the relative
importance of all of the elements).
118. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258. The Court stated that granting quasi-suspect status would
"subject all government action based on [a suspect] classification to more searching evaluation."
Id. at 3258. Furthermore, the Court stated that consideration of mental handicaps was relevant
to many governmental objectives; laws designed to benefit the mentally handicapped must
necessarily be classified along those lines.
119. The Court could not resist the floodgate argument, noting that "the aging, the disabled,
the mentally ill, and the infirm" would all attempt to show unequal treatment from at least
some segment of society. Id. at 3258. But the Court does not address the logical rejoinder: if
these groups can show that a legislative body has invidiously or thoughtlessly exploited their
vulnerability, why should they not expect their interests to be protected by the judiciary?
120. The Court examined each of the city's objectives, as identified by the court of appeals,
and found that the special use permit was not rationally related to any of them. Id. at 3258-
60.
121. Id.
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The majority opinion in Cleburne highlights three serious weaknesses in
the three-tiered system.'22 First, by focusing its attention on the challenged
classification rather than on the disadvantaged plaintiff class, 2 3 the Court
generalizes the harm perpetrated by the government and overlooks the
possibility of "the sort of prejudiced, thoughtless or stereotyped action that
offends principles of equality found in the Fourteenth Amendment." 2 4 This,
in turn, depersonalizes the underlying cause of action and causes the Court
to lose sight of the "peculiar disadvantage [to the] suspect class."' 2 - Also,
the three-tiered approach pigeonholes legislation by classification of the
parties affected; the classification in turn predetermines the type of scrutiny
applied and often predetermines the outcome as well. 26 Such judicial ster-
eotyping is as improper as the legislative stereotyping which the Court so
often condemns. For example, the Court demands that legislative classifi-
cations be based on such criteria as height, weight and strength, rather than
on the basis of gender. 27 Accordingly, a decision to grant heightened scrutiny
122. The Court's movement toward a middle level of scrutiny was initially hailed as a means
of invalidating discriminatory classifications without denying the legislatures the ability to justify
the use of those classifications in certain instances. Professor Gunther, in particular, saw great
hope in minimum rationality with "bite." Gunther, supra note 8. The cases he cited to support
this view, such as Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), were the forerunners of heightened
scrutiny, though they were also phrased in minimum rationality terms. The Court's resistance
to expanding heightened scrutiny beyond gender and illegitimacy, its balancing of principles in
affirmative action and alienage cases, and its renewed application of the minimum rationality
standard have led to almost universal criticism of the three-tiered approach. Professor Shaman
criticized the rigidity of the three-tiered system, particularly the total deference given to all
legislation not classified as suspect and therefore relegated to an extremely deferential minimum
rationality review. See Shaman, supra note 7, at 178 ("[in reaching (his conclusion in Plyler]
the Chief Justice insisted that the state law was not 'irrational' only after admitting in the very
first sentence of his opinion that the law was 'senseless.' But such oxymorons [sic] are endemic
to minimal scrutiny"). Professor Hutchinson also criticized the current tendency of the Court
to apply the same type of analysis regardless of the level of scrutiny the Court claims it is
using. See Hutchinson, supra note 57. Other critics have focused on the Court's failure to
concretely and consistently articulate the factors considered in balancing competing interests.
See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1082 (factors should include the importance of the state's
objective, the relationship of the classification to the state's objective, the state purposes
articulated prior to litigation, the state purposes articulated during litigation, and the opportunity
afforded plaintiffs to rebut presumptions inherent in the classifications affecting them). Accord
Fox, supra note 7, at 525 (arguing for the application of Professor Tribe's factors).
123. See Sherry, supra note 66, at 105-08 (discussing the different effects of focusing on
classifications rather than classes).
124. 105 S. Ct. at 3272 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
125. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
126. See Shaman, supra note 7, at 173 (criticizes the rigidity of the three-tiered system).
127. Many gender classifications would pass constitutional muster under the minimum ra-
tionality test, because that standard allows for classification on the basis of legislative efficiency,
and gender is loosely related to certain legislative choices. See, e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc.
v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959). By requiring other, more specific methods of classification,
legislators are forced to look at the specific characteristics that created a former gender preference
and classify on that basis (e.g. height, weight, strength, etc.). In that way, the door is opened
to qualified candidates of either gender, while unqualified candidates are still excluded.
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should be based on the presence of suspect characteristics that a legislature
may have exploited, rather than on the conclusion that the classification
itself is often, or always, used for improper purposes. The Court seems
unwilling to review equal protection challenges on the basis of the charac-
teristics which a challenging class possesses. To the contrary, the Court
brands whole classifications as "inherently suspect," "quasi-suspect," or
"not suspect" and applies a predetermined level of review to each label.
This was the case in Cleburne, where the Court ostensibly refused to apply
heightened scrutiny 2" even though the mentally retarded are politically im-
potent, have a history of discriminatory treatment, are saddled with an
immutable trait and are victims of irrational prejudice.' 29
The second weakness in the three-tiered system is the operation of pre-
sumptions which the Court attaches to the different levels of review. 3" Justice
White feels that granting quasi-suspect status to the mentally retarded would
also require the Court to invalidate laws which only incidentally burden that
class or are actually designed to benefit it.'"' While the Court has at times
allowed such a presumption of invalidity to operate in regard to race,' it
has certainly not done so in regard to gender, illegitimacy, alienage or
fundamental rights.'" The implication that such presumptions would bind
the courts or inhibit legislatures is therefore not a realistic concern.
The third flaw in the three-tiered system is the inflexibility of the review.
Although all of the justices agreed that the law under review in Cleburne
was unfairly discriminatory in some respect, their refusal to grant quasi-
128. Justice Marshall argued that the Court actually applied heightened scrutiny. Cleburne,
105 S. Ct. at 3263 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). See also supra notes 86-95
(heightened scrutiny actually applied in all successful minimum rationality challenges).
129. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
130. Justice White feels that legislation subjected to heightened scrutiny should be presumed
unconstitutional. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258 ("quasi-suspect classification . . . subject[s] all
governmental action based on that classification to more searching evaluation"). But see id. at
3262 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("every law that places the mentally retarded in a special class
is not presumptively irrational").
131. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
132. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (race specific classifi-
cations are inherently suspect even if the complainant is white).
133. See Heckler v. Matthews, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984) (gender classifications used for a
limited time to secure expectations formed prior to change in law not unconstitutional); Brown
v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983) (89% deviation in average county representation does not
deny equal protection); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (law that deprives unwed father
of notice of adoption proceeding, where father had failed to request such notice during statutory
period, does not deny equal protection); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (requiring
parole officers to be United States citizens does not deny equal protection); Michael M. v.
Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (statutory rape law that differentiates on
basis of gender does not deny equal protection); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979)
(barring father from suing for wrongful death of illegitimate child does not deny equal
protection); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (denying teacher certification to aliens
does not deny equal protection).
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suspect status to the mentally handicapped left the Court no doctrinal
foothold permitting it to invalidate the ordinance. The traditional minimum
rationality test would have been insufficient to support invalidation because
the city proferred several justifications for its zoning decision.'34 Only by
giving the rationality test teeth could the Court achieve its compromise of
depriving the mentally retarded quasi-suspect status and yet lending them
support in the single case before it. By stiffening the minimum rationality
test in Cleburne and other cases this Term, the Court has undermined the
predictability of the three-tiered scheme.
2. Concurring Opinion of Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens rejected the three-tiered analysis purportedly applied by
the majority. In its place, he proposed a unitary standard of equal protection
that would only ask whether the challenged legislation has a rational basis.'"
Justice Stevens defined a rational classification as one that an impartial
lawmaker could logically believe to serve a legitimate public purpose and
that benefits society more than it harms the disadvantaged class. 36 He also
identified three factors to weigh in passing on the rationality of a classifi-
cation: (1) the nature of the class harmed; (2) the public purposes served by
the classification; and (3) the characteristics used to distinguish one class
from another.'" Finally, Justice Stevens rejected any blanket presumption
of unconstitutionality for certain types of classifications. He wrote that the
various degrees of relevancy of classifications to their corresponding legis-
lative goals should be the focus of the Court's analysis.' s
Justice Stevens's "rational basis" test clearly calls for a higher degree of
relevancy than does the traditional minimum rationality test.'3 9 However,
Justice Stevens -explained neither how the listed factors should specifically
bear on particular legislation, nor in what way the factors relate to each
134. See Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 668
(1981) (minimum rationality test asks only whether the challenged legislation has a legitimate
purpose and whether it would be reasonable for the lawmakers to believe that the use of the
challenged classification would promote that purpose); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers,
358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959) ("it has long been settled that a classification, though discriminatory,
is not arbitrary nor violative of the Equal Protection Clause ... if any state of facts reasonably
can be conceived that would sustain it") (emphasis added); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348
U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("lelvils in the same field may be of different dimensions . . . requiring
different remedies, or so the legislature may think .... [Rleform may take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind").
135. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3261 (Stevens, J., concurring).
136. Id. See also United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("we must discover a correlation between the classification and either
the actual purpose of the statute or a legitimate purpose that we may reasonably presume to
have motivated an impartial legislature").
137. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3261-62 (Stevens, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 3262 (Stevens, J., concurring).
139. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
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other. Because the test has no external standards, it is apparently based on
the internal values of the particular judges hearing a case. As Justice Stevens
noted, "I have always asked myself whether I could find a 'rational basis'
for the classification at issue.""' By merely substituting the judgment of the
Court for the judgment of the legislature, this analysis epitomizes substantive
judicial decision-making.' 4'
Justice Stevens fails to define the degree of rationality that he would
demand in equal protection cases. Nor does he state whether he would
require different degrees of rationality based on the tradition of disfavor,
the importance of the governmental interest or the relevancy of the classified
characteristic. 42 The only hint given by Justice Stevens is that he would be
"especially vigilant" in evaluating the rationality of classifications involving
groups with a "tradition of disfavor."' 4  This Note fails to discern any
140. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3261 (Stevens, J., concurring).
141. As Justice Holmes stated: "[p]eople want to know under what circumstances [they will
be affected by the laws). The object of our study [of law], then, is prediction, the prediction
of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts." 0. HOLMES,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 (1920). Rules of law that depend solely on the subjective standards
of individual judges operate unpredictably. Subjectivity in equal protection analysis has often
been criticized. See Weidner, The Equal Protection Clause: The Continuing Search for Judicial
Standards, 57 U. DET. J. URn. L. 867, 917 (1980) (Supreme Court's "inconsistency in applying
its standards of review" has given the appearance of subjective adjudication and has resulted
in uncertainty about what the Court will do in the future). Moreover, judical lawmaking has
been criticized as anti-democratic because judges are neither elected nor politically responsible
to the people. H. DEAN, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRACY 5-6 (1966;. The argument against
indiscriminate lawmaking in the equal protection context has been concisely stated by Judge
Ripple:
"[alssuming, arguendo, the legitimacy of the judiciary's role in Constitutional policy
making, its capacity to obtain sufficiently comprehensible information . . . and to
assess that information is hardly a given. Neither a judge's training in the law nor
the usual tools of the judicial process are geared to permit the absorption, digestion,
and appreciation of all the data necessary to making fundamental policy choices.
While the adversary process works quite well in establishing adjudicative facts...
it is hardly the ideal forum to analyze major economic and social trends of a diverse
society."
K. RIPPLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 65-66 (1984).
This is not to say that judicial review of equal protection should never take place, but
merely that judges should invalidate legislation only subject to "simple, realistic and reasonably
specific legal rules." Weidner, supra, at 917. In most contexts, it is beyond the competency of
the judiciary to consider exactly the same interests as the legislature. However, in equal protection
cases, once the court determines that the disadvantaged group is beyond the circle of political
effectiveness, the court is obliged to examine whether the legislature has adequately considered
the interests of that group. If the courts intervene in the legislative process only in the manner
suggested in this Note, then such intervention does not violate separation of powers. To the
contrary, it is an exercise of that principle because the judiciary acts as a check on the
majoritarian excesses of the legislature, to ensure that the government operates on a minimum
level of equality for all persons.
142. See supra note 92 (discussing the difference between relevance and rationality).
143. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3261 n.6 (Stevens J., concurring).
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appreciable difference between "heightened scrutiny for suspect classes" and
"special vigilance for disfavored groups." It is uncertain how Justice Stevens
intends to break away from current equal protection analysis.
As Justice Marshall points out, lower courts should be able to apply the
Supreme Court's rationale to cases brought before them.'" Although Justice
Stevens may know unfair discrimination when he sees it, his proposed rational
basis test does little to help lower courts to apply his standard consistently.
Absent major revisions, this approach would soon be found unworkable.
Nonetheless, Justice Stevens's approach possesses two attractive features.
First, by eliminating stereotyped classifications, his approach exposes more
discriminatory legislation to potential review in the courts. Second, because
there are no presumptions of unconstitutionality imbedded in his analysis,
the courts can explicitly balance all of the factors in a case without having
to reach threshold questions about the character of the injured class. Justice
Stevens's rational basis test allows courts to balance the degree and nature
of the injury against the state's objectives to determine whether equal
protection has been denied.
3. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Marshall
Justice Marshall concurred in the holding of the case, but dissented from
the Court's decision to base its holding on the minimum rationality test.'45
According to Justice Marshall, the Court actually applied heightened scrutiny
to the case. He reviewed previous applications of the minimum rationality
test to show that the Cleburne ordinance could easily withstand that test. 46
Justice Marshall wrote that the Court should have expressly applied height-
ened scrutiny to the mentally retarded because that class suffers political
impotence and a history of unequal treatment. 4 Under heightened scrutiny,
Justice Marshall concluded that the Cleburne ordinance was facially uncon-
stitutional. 48
Justice Marshall has presented perhaps the most consistent and concrete
alternative view of equal protection analysis among the Court's justices. 49
More than any other justice, he has recognized that what the Court says
144. Id. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
145. Id. at 3263.
146. Id. at 3264-65.
147. Id. at 3266-67.
148. Id. at 3268.
149. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("concentration must be placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to individuals ... of the governmental benefits ... and the asserted state interests").
Accord Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (Marshall, J.. concurring); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 99 (1973) (Marshall. J., dissenting); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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and what it does have frequently been worlds apart."" Like Justice Stevens,
Justice Marshall rejects any rigidly tiered system of equal protection analy-
sis."' He argues that the Court should employ a balancing test with a sliding
scale of scrutiny that varies with the character of the classification, the nature
of the alleged injury, and the governmental interests asserted in support of
the classification.' Justice Marshall's equal protection analysis differs from
Justice White's and Justice Stevens's tests in two respects: Justice Marshall
keeps minimum rationality review truly minimal,' and he carefully distin-
guishes the types of cases to which he would apply heightened scrutiny., 4
In contrast to Justice Stevens, who would apply his test to all challenged
legislation, Justice Marshall would limit his heightened scrutiny review to
social legislation."' For classifications subject to heightened scrutiny, Justice
Marshall would balance the injury and the "recognized invidiousness of the
basis upon which the particular classification is drawn" against the asserted
governmental interest."16
Justice Marshall's willingness to grant heightened scrutiny to all social
legislation would not allay the fears raised in Justice White's opinion. Justice
White would see such a threshold for review as establishing the Court as a
guarantor of minority interests, handcuffing legislators in their attempt to
solve complex social problems through experimental legislation. Justice Mar-
shall's analysis would allow the Court to review any social legislation in
which it discerned "unfair" discrimination," 7 unbounded by any presump-
150. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3264 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting) ("the Court does
not label its handiwork heightened scrutiny .. . [b]ut however labeled, the rational basis test
invoked today is most assuredly not the rational basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical, Allied
Stores v. Bowers, and their progeny") (citations omitted). Accord Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
231 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
i, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
151. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. I, 98 (1973).
152. Justice Marshall argues that the Court has followed this approach all along, though
couching its handiwork in minimum rationality language. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3264 (Marshall,
J., concurring and dissenting) (Supreme Court's method of analysis is "precisely the sort of
probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny").
153. Id. at 3264-65 (Marshall J., concurring and dissenting) (true minimum rationality test
would be insufficiently stringent to invalidate Cleburne's ordinance).
154. Id. at 3265 (suggestion that the traditional rational basis test allows this sort of searching
inquiry creates precedent for Court to subject economic and commercial classifications to stiffer
"ordinary" rational basis review).
155. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Marshall characterized the potential
for invalidation of economic legislation as "a small and regrettable step back toward the days
of Lochner."
156. Id.
157. For instance, Justice Marshall would have used heightened scrutiny to review legislation
that set a ceiling on welfare benefits, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), although the only disadvantaged class was "large families." Id. at 475. Justice
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tion that would automatically require invalidation. He would then apply a
balancing test and invalidate those statutes in which the state's interest did
not outweigh the discriminatory effects of the classification.
IV. IMPACT
The plurality opinion in Cleburne purportedly adhered to the three-tiered
system of equal protection analysis. Nevertheless, six justices plainly aban-
doned the lower limits of minimum rationality and raised the level of scrutiny
in a case where traditional equal protection analysis failed to achieve a just
result.' -  However, as Justice Marshall demonstrated, a rational basis test
fails to establish objective standards for lower courts to apply and leaves
the Supreme Court unaccountable for its decisions. 59 A rational basis test,
in theory, can be used to invalidate any type of legislation. It can be used
to invalidate economic legislation with no discernible adverse impact on any
group with suspect characteristics, or it can be used only to invalidate those
classifications that have a disparate impact on groups which, while not
inherently or quasi-suspect, nevertheless share certain indicia of suspectness.
Precedent shows that it has been the tendency of the Burger Court to do
the latter.16w The unusual number of decisions rendered during the 1985 Term
under the minimum rationality test may send a signal to the lower courts
that a more substantive review of equal protection cases will be tolerated.
However, such review by the lower courts may not evidence the same concern
for the presence of suspect characteristics that the Supreme Court has
exhibited.
This split over the need for objective standards is not unique to equal
protection. The debate over the appropriate standard of review for equal
protection is contained within a larger debate over the role of judicial review.
Observers who support active, substantive judicial review 6 ' would support
Marshall's view of who should receive heightened scrutiny is highly substantive and includes
the "destitue [sic], disabled, [and] elderly individuals." Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90
(1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158. Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger would apply the rational basis test to all equal
protection challenges. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3260-61 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices White,
Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor would apply the rational basis test to classifications not
subject to strict or heightened scrutiny. Id. at 3258.
159. Id. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
160. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
161. A substantive approach to judicial review is related to the philosophy of judicial activism.
L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 991. This philosophy encompasses review based on judicial standards
found outside the constitutional text, such as standards discovered in some form of "natural
law." Tushnet, supra note 66, at 1042-45 (1980). The natural law theory was employed as early
as 1823 by Justice Bushrod Washington. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (privileges and immunities clause applies to those rights which, by their
nature, are fundamental, and belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments). Sub-
stantive theory reached its apex in the Lochner era, when the Court required a high degree of
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minimum constraints on judicial decisions about equal protection. Observers
who believe that constitutional review should only be undertaken with ref-
erence to specific textual and precedential criteria will insist on objective
equal protection standards. 62 Any consistent approach to constitutional
adjudication must examine the nature of the equal protection clause and its
place within the constitutional framework. This Note argues that a decision
to grant heightened scrutiny should be made by reference to objective
standards. However, once the court has decided that heightened scrutiny is
appropriate, it must be free to weigh substantively the propriety of the
classification.
Commentators favor two alternatives to the current three-tiered analysis.
The most popular is the approach favored by Justice Marshall, in which the
challenged legislation is reviewed under a single balancing test where the
nature of the classification is one of many factors to consider. 63 The other
is a process-based approach, reminiscent of the two-tiered Warren Court
rationality for all types of legislation, economic and social alike. Tribe, supra note 66, at 1065-
66 (1980). Modern-day adherents of substantive theory are more apt to limit the reaches of
substantive review to social legislation. See, e.g., Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (Marshall, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Substantive theory is result-oriented and relies on the internal values
of the particular reviewing judge or court. The major contention posited by the theory's
opponents is the failure of substantive theory to adequately explain when expanded judicial
review is appropriate and to set any logical, concrete limits on judicial initiative. See generally
Sherry, supra note 66.
162. This review is termed "process-based." Tribe, supra note 66, at 1063. As Professor
Tribe explains: "The theme was anticipated by John Marshall [McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435-36 (1819)1; it assumed a central role for Harlan Fiske Stone [United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)1; it signally motivated Earl Warren
[See Ely, The Chief, 88 HARv. L. REV. 11, 12 (1974)1; and it has been elaborated . . . most
powerfully in the work of John Ely." (Citations inserted in place of footnotes). Tribe, supra
note 66, at 1072-73. Process-based theories contend that judicial review should be limited to
either those instances in which normal political processes break down; see Sherry, supra note
66, at 103-04; or when there are formal or functional obstacles to the assertion of political
power. See Tushnet, supra note 66, at 1045. See generally J. ELY, supra note 66 (merits and
shortcomings of interpretivism in judicial review).
163. Professor Shaman explicitly favors the Marshall approach. Shaman, supra note 7, at
177-78. Others propose variations on the balancing test theme. Professor Wilkinson suggests
that the Court should focus on the nature of the inequality rather than on the disadvantaged
group. He balances the importance of the opportunity being denied, the strength of the state
interest served in denying it, and the character of the groups whose opportunities are being
denied. Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 991. In an interesting twist, Professor Wilkinson proposes
that inequalities in political opportunity should receive strict scrutiny, inequalities in economic
opportunity should receive heightened scrutiny, and mere economic inequalities should receive
a minimum rationality review. Id. at 946. It is difficult to see how this proposal accounts for
a case such as Cleburne, which involved none of those types of inequality. Most balancing tests
would apply a single level of review to these various types of classifications, with the nature
of the inequality being one of the variable factors. See, e.g., Blattner, supra note 7, at 841-42
("Itlhe answer to the question of 'what inequalities are tolerable under what circumstances' lies
not in the mechanical application of various standards of review, but in a vision of what
constitutes just and unjust disadvantaging").
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
analysis. Under this approach, classifications that discriminate against a class
excluded from the political process should invariably be struck down, while
those that do not are allowed to stand."6 The first alternative focuses mainly
on the method of review; the character of the challenging class is just one
of many factors to weigh. The second focuses almost entirely on the nature
of the classification, thus limiting any meaningful review. 165
Alternatively, this Note proposes a three-step analysis that borrows features
from both of these tests. The first step would be to determine whether the
classified group possesses one or more suspect characteristic or "indicia of
suspectness."'11 The second step would be to find whether the legislation
exploits those characteristics to the detriment of the class. If the legislation
did not exploit a suspect characteristic, further review would be denied. 67
If the legislation did exploit a suspect characteristic, the third step would be
to subject the legislation to heightened scrutiny. This heightened scrutiny
would consist of a single balancing test in which the Court would weigh the
seriousness of the alleged injury (or the nature of the right affected), the
nature of the allegedly exploited characteristic, and the importance of the
governmental interest. In those cases where an injury results from prejudiced,
thoughtless or stereotyped exploitation of a group's suspect characteristics,'"6
the law should be struck down unless the governmental purpose is found to
outweigh the injury.
164. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 66 (arguing that the major focus should be on the
disadvantaged class rather than on the classification); Hutchinson, supra note 57, at 193 (recent
decisions have had "the combined effect of turning the interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause into an exercise of balancing competing interests whose weights are a function of prior
case law only to a limited degree").
165. The failure of the first alternative is its inability to posit any objective standards for
assessing which groups should be protected by the equal protection clause. While the second
alternative offers such a standard, it denies the judiciary any meaningful review as to whether
the legislature has properly considered the interests of protected groups. The equal protection
clause presents us with perhaps the greatest of constitutional paradoxes-while judicial review
of legislative enactments is certainly antimajoritarian, see supra note 141, the equal protection
clause specifically places a check on the majoritarian exploitation of politically disfavored
groups. See infra notes 173-86 and accompanying text. Any effective model for equal protection
analysis must take both of these principles into account.
166. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
167. The result may be a corollary of the political question doctrine. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1969) ("[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion"). Cf. K. RIPPLE, supra note 141 (the judiciary does possess the tools
for making legislative decisions).
168. 105 S. Ct. at 3272 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). Proof of legislative intent
to discriminate should not be required. A showing that the legislature failed to account for the
interests of protected groups should be sufficient to warrant review. See Note, Discriminatory
Purpose, supra note 53 (intent requirements in this area unreasonable).
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A. Granting Review-Process or Substance?
Professor Lawrence Tribe has shown that many of the Constitution's most
crucial commitments are substantive in character' 6 9 and that taking a purely
process-based approach to the entire gamut of judicial review is logically
inconsistent."' However, he concedes that many parts of the Constitution
address solely procedural matters. 7' In view of the different purposes served
by separate sections of the Constitution, it is not necessary to take a strict,
unitary approach to all constitutional review. To the contrary, it would not
be inconsistent to apply different kinds of judicial review to different clauses
of the Constitution.' 72 Accepting that process-based and substantive review
each may be appropriate for different constitutional issues, the threshold
question is whether the equal protection clause was meant to create substan-
tive rights or was meant to ensure the proper operation of the political
process.
Although there is little consensus about the original intention behind the
fourteenth amendment,' 73 it is clear that Congress adopted the equal protec-
tion clause to ensure that states did not deny recently freed slaves the concrete
enjoyment of substantive rights granted under the thirteeth,'74 fourteenth'7 5
and fifteenth'7 6 amendments and various federal statutes.'" As such, the
clause appears to be a procedural safeguard, primarily for blacks, and was
originally interpreted that way.' 7 Beyond this threshold consideration, it
must be asked whether Congress intended to create a provision that would
prohibit classification on the basis of irrelevant criteria (requiring a substan-
tive form of review) or whether it was intended to prohibit majoritarian
infringement of minority rights (requiring a process-based response).
No serious commentator would suggest today that race has relevancy as
a classification for any but the most unusual purposes.'7 9 Yet to the framers
169. Tribe, supra note 66, at 1065.
170. Id. at 1067.
171. Id.
172. See Sherry, supra note 66, at 103 ("[tlhose who seek to avoid the defects of the two
extreme models [of pure colorblind review and substantive review] must construct a theory that
places some workable constraints on judicial action and that is consistent with both history and
precedent").
173. J. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
73 (1983).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I (abolition of slavery).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (citizenship, privileges and immunities, and due process
clauses).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I (voting rights).
177. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at
42 U.S.C. 1981 (1982)). It was to ensure the constitutionality of this and other acts that the
fourteenth amendment was proposed. J. BAER, supra note 173, at 76.
178. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
179. Race has been held to be a relevant factor when legislatures or courts seek to remedy
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of the fourteenth amendment, race was a highly relevant trait."', The con-
sensus among the legislators who passed the fourteenth amendment was that
blacks were inferior to whites, but that certain rights inured to the individual
quite apart from capacity. Chief among these rights was equality in regards
to the rights and benefits of citizenship.'"' Apparently, relevancy of classi-
fication was not the key to the framers' demand for equal protection.
If nothing else, a primary purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to
ensure against majoritarian backlash, negating and limiting the rights of a
the present effects of past discrimination. See Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (race
specific classifications made by Congress do not violate equal protection if Congress has passed
such laws to remedy the present effects of past discrimination); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (race specific legislation will be allowed if related to remedy of
past official discrimination, provided a determination of such discrimination has been made by
a competent body); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (legislature may dilute
the voting strength of Hasidic Jewish community in order to ensure that black voting strength
is not diluted); Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (courts may order race specific
remedy to correct effects of past de jure discrimination).
180. J. BAER, supra note 173, at 83. See, e.g., Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., Ist Sess.
177-78 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Boyer) (blacks should first be educated, and if they prove not
to be intellectually and spiritually inferior to whites, given the right to vote). See generally THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY DE-
BATES IN CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS (A. Avins ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES].
181. J. BAER, supra note 173. A pre-war debate between Jefferson Davis of Mississippi and
Henry Wilson of Massachusetts is representative:
WILSON: The natural equality of all men I believe in, as far as rights are concerned.
So far as mental or physical equality is concerned, I believe the African race inferior
to the white race.
DAVIS: "Natural equality" would imply that God had created them equal, and had
left them equal, down to the present time ....
WILSON: I believe in the equality of rights of all mankind. I do not believe in the
equality of the African race with the white race, mentally or physically, and I do
not think morally .... [B]ut upon the question of equality of rights, I believe in
the equality of all men of every race, blood and kindred.
DAVIS: When the Senator says "equality of rights of all men," does he mean
political and social rights-political and social equality? ...
WILSON: I believe that every human being has the right to his life and to his liberty
and to act in this world so as to secure his own happiness. I believe, in a word, in
the Declaration of Independence, but I do not, as I have said, believe in the mental
or physical equality (of the African race].
DAVIS: Then the Senator believes and he does not believe. He believes . . . that all
men are equal; but he [believes) that there is a difference between the two races.
WnsoN: I believe that there are a great many men in the world of the white race
inferior to the Senator from Misissippi [sic], and I suppose there are quite a number
superior to him; but I believe that he and the inferior man and the superior have
equal natural rights.
Congressional Globe, April 12, 1860, S. 1685-86; RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES,
supra note 181, at 27-28.
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despised class.'5 2 Two hundred and fifty years of slavery"5 3 had left blacks
for the most part poor, uneducated, despised and disenfranchised.' 4 More-
over, the color of their skin made them easy targets for discrimination. Such
traits left them open to exploitation by a more politically powerful majority.
Because classifications based on national origin, alienage, gender and ille-
gitimacy share many of the defects associated with classifications based on
race, they too have been declared suspect."' Precedent also shows that the
Court has consistently looked to the nature of the disadvantaged class, even
when invalidating legislation that inhibits fundamental rights or that does
not satisfy the minimum rationality test."' 6 The decision whether to grant
review to equal protection challenges is therefore properly a process-based
determination. Under the proposed model, step one would grant review only
on a finding that the plaintiff is a member of a group with suspect char-
acteristics, and step two would require that the classification actually turn
on, or exploit, one of those suspect characteristics.
The Court's current system of granting heightened scrutiny only when
certain disfavored classifications are used is unsuitable. This approach results
in either the judicial gymnastics of a standardless rational basis review, or
the absence of meaningful review for classifications that do not "qualify"
for heightened scrutiny."'7 Rather than reviewing legislation on the basis of
classification, the Court should look to whether the plaintiff challenging the
legislation is a member of a class which has suspect characteristics and
whether the challenged legislation improperly exploits those characteristics."'
182. See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text. See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964) (central purpose of equal protection clause is to eliminate racial discrimination
from official sources within the states). Cf. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. Rav. I, 60 (1955) (fourteenth amendment deals with all
discrimination, not just racial discrimination).
183. The first slaves were brought to the colonies in 1619. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW I (1st ed. 1973).
184. These traits and conditions exemplify the "indicia of suspectness" that have been
identified by the Court, see supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text, as the primary focal
point in determining whether a class is suspect and deserving of heightened scrutiny.
185. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (fundamental rights cases actually turn
on presence of class with suspect characteristics) & 86-95 and accompanying text (minimum
rationality decisions actually turn on the presence of a class with suspect characteristics).
187. See supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
188. One example is United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). In
Moreno, Congress identified a politically disfavored group and wrote a statute that exploited
a group characteristic-communal living among hippies-and deprived food stamps to that
class. In New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), the transit authority
refused to employ users of narcotic drugs, including those who used methadone to recover
from heroin addiction. Such legislation should receive heightened scrutiny because it facially
discriminates against a despised class. In Beazer, though, the transit authority's legitimate
concern for the safety of its employees and passengers presented a suitable, non-biased reason
for the classification. Under the test proposed in this Note, the case would receive heightened
19851
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Such review would require the judiciary to take a more liberal view of what
constitutes suspect classifications. Courts would also need to study the
characteristics of the challenging group in each case, and determine whether
the challenged legislation exploits those characteristics, rather than merely
examining the supposed relevance of the classification as a whole."'9 Without
tying their hands in future cases, courts could then protect such groups as
the illegal alien children of Plyler v. Doe,"'" the hippies of United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,"' the poor of Griffin v. Illinois,,"2
the homosexuals of National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education, '3 the
drug users of New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,"" and the mentally
handicapped of Cleburne. Contrary to Justice White's concerns, new clas-
sifications of suspect groups would not create graven presumptions of un-
constitutionality in all cases. Statutes that disadvantage a group but do not
unfairly exploit group infirmities would still be upheld.
B. Method of Review-Substantive Heightened Scrutiny
To say that the decision to grant review should be process-based does not
necessarily require a process-based method of review. The Court's current
approach to equal protection has led to a focus on classifications and
presumptions of unconstitutionality which make the Court unwilling to
extend quasi-suspect status beyond gender and illegitimacy.',5 Such near-
sighted reliance on classifications has resulted in both the validation of
legislation which has a de facto disparate impact on suspect classes and the
invalidation of state action designed to benefit such groups.,"
scrutiny, but the challenge would fail if the state could prove that methadone users caused
safety risks.
189. The "all or nothing" approach that the Court applies in the traditional three-tiered
analysis would deny heightened scrutiny to groups in which individual members have distin-
guishing characteristics that legislatures may properly take into account, or to which many
legislative classifications are likely to be valid. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255, 3258. But see id.
at 3269-71 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting) (characteristics must be relevant under
particular circumstances). Such an approach leaves no avenue for the invalidation of non-
suspect classifications, such as that found in Cleburne, other than the standardless rational
basis test. Alternatively, by reviewing on the basis of characteristics and by requiring the
plaintiff to show that such characteristics have been improperly exploited, the Court would be
free to balance the seriousness of the injury against the governmental interests.
190. 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (statute bars resident alien children from attending free public
school).
191. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). See supra note 188.
192. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (challenge to fees for criminal trial transcript necessary for statutory
appeal).
193. 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984) (statute bars from employment as teacher anyone who
advocates homosexual lifestyle), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985).
194. 440 U.S. 568 (1979). See supra note 188.
195. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
196. Sherry, supra note 66, at 114-19. For example, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
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A primary purpose of the equal protection clause was to ensure that the
political processes did not work to the detriment of certain classes." 7 Never-
theless, the guarantee of equality is itself substantive. 9 The meaning of the
word is largely personal in nature and not easily written into exact statutory
language. It is precisely the role of the judiciary to give concrete substantive
meaning to enduring principles that evade rigid codification. 99 For this
reason, a balancing test such as that proposed by Justice Marshall is the
most appropriate method of review for determining whether a suspect sta-
tutory scheme is the result of "prejudiced, thoughtless, or stereotyped action
that offends principles of equality found in the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 2 '
At this third step in the proposed model, a court should consider the relevancy
of the classification to determine whether the classification is suitably tailored
to an important state interest. A balancing test implies the application of
substantive values. The judiciary must determine what harms are serious and
what interests are compelling or important. Such an approach may overlap
the role of the legislature, but a process-based approach to granting height-
ened review limits such review to classifications that impinge only on the
politically powerless. 2 ' This overlap of the judicial and legislative roles is
preferable to allowing the rights of the politically powerless to fall through
the cracks of the governmental system.
(1976), the Court held that a test given to police officer candidates did not violate equal
protection, even though it had a discriminatory impact on black applicants. The Court reasoned
that the test was neither facially nor intentionally discriminatory. This argument overlooks the
fact that by leaving a test in operation that is known to have racially discriminatory effects, a
legislature is negligently or knowingly, if not intentionally, discriminating. See Note, Discrim-
inatory Purpose, supra note 53. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
the Court struck down a voluntary affirmative action program, even though the program did
not degrade minorities. The individual plaintiff, a white applicant to medical school, had no
vested right to attend any particular school and had the necessary qualifications to attend any
number of other medical schools. Justice Powell, delivering the Court's opinion, used a "color-
blind" approach. He reasoned that if facially racial classifications were wrong at all, they were
wrong no matter which race was disadvantaged. It is more likely that the intent of the equal
protection clause was to protect the politically weak rather than to declare race a constitutional
irrelevancy. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 173-86 and accompanying text.
198. L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 991 ("a norm of equality [cannot] be given real content
without imposing significant constraints upon the substantive choices that political majorities
* might feel strongly inclined to make").
199. Id. See also Greenwalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality? 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167
(1983) (discussing equality as an aspect of moral evaluation); Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982) (proposition that "people who are alike should be
treated alike" is tautological and creates confusion).
200. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3272 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
201. To do otherwise would make the Court the watchdog of minority political aspirations.
It is not minorities per se that require judicial protection, but rather despised minorities. The
Court should not protect the political agendas of these minorities. It should protect their right
to be free from burdens that the politically powerful do not share and to share the benefits
that the politically powerful vote for themselves.
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C. Review of "Non-Suspect" Legislation
Under a process-based method of granting review, legislation that was not
shown to exploit the suspect characteristics of a challenging class would be
upheld without further inquiry." 2 However, this should not leave legislatures
free to enact arbitrary statutes. Totally arbitrary laws-laws that have no
relationship to any legitimate state interest-violate the due process clause
and could be invalidated on that ground.' 3 But other non-suspect classifi-
cations that exhibit some relationship to a legitimate state purpose should
be left to the normal political processes. 1 However, it should be re-empha-
sized that the proposed model would work only if the judiciary is willing to
grant review to legislative classifications on the basis of potentially improper
exploitation of suspect characteristics.2"5
D. Application of the Proposed Review
Under the proposed model for equal protection review, the Cleburne
statute would be reviewed under heightened scrutiny and invalidated. The
mentally retarded are politically ineffective as a class, have a history of
unequal treatment and have been despised as a group. '1 As Justice White
pointed out, there was a strong possibility that the Cleburne ordinance
"rest[ed] on an irrational prejudice" against the mentally retarded.0 7 There-
fore, with a strong possibility that the ordinance exploited the suspect
characteristics of that group, substantive review of the ordinance and its
effect is appropriate. Because the Court held that governmental objectives
served by the legislation did not outweigh the harm to the disadvantaged
class, the ordinance would be invalidated under this Note's model.
In inother case from last term, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Ward,2(1 a narrow majority of the court invalidated an Alabama statute that
taxed foreign insurance companies at a higher rate than domestic ones.
Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, reasoned that the asserted state
purpose behind the statute, promoting domestic industry, was not validly
served by discrimination against foreign corporations. 211, Under this Note's
model, the Court would first have to determine whether the disadvantaged
group, foreign insurance companies, possessed any suspect characteristics.
202. Under a true minimum rationality test, a classification will only be invalidated for
violating due process. See supra note 92.
203. See supra note 92.
204. If a law is not totally arbitrary or violative of some other constitutional provision, it is
expressly the province of the legislature to enact it through the normal "give-and-take" political
processes.
205. See supra notes 187-96 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3266-67 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 3260.




Although the dormant commerce clause does not apply to the insurance
industry by congressional decree,2"' and the privileges and immunities clause
does not apply to corporations, 2 ' there is nevertheless a strong constitutional
bias against the unequal treatment of nonresidents. 2'2 This constitutional bias
is supported by the historical prejudice against foreign corporations. Al-
though corporations can lobby to protect their interests in any state, foreign
corporations are not the political equals of a united domestic industry.
Because foreign corporations as a class share some suspect characteristics,
the next step would be to determine whether Alabama exploited those
characteristics by imposing a tax. It is doubtful that a legislature could
exploit the political ineffectiveness of an industry as politically powerful as
insurance companies. 2 3 Also, nothing in the record showed that the tax was
inspired by a prejudiced desire to benefit domestic companies at the expense
of outsiders. To the contrary, there was some evidence that the tax advantage
enabled domestic insurers to provide needed insurance services to state
residents that the foreign companies did not offer.2' 4 It is fair to conclude
that the Alabama statute did not exploit the suspect characteristics of foreign
insurance companies. Under this Note's model, further review would be
denied.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority decision in Cleburne highlights the deficiencies present in
the three-tiered system of analyzing equal protection challenges. 2' 5 While the
Court has attempted to compensate for these deficiencies under the guise of
giving "bite" to minimum rationality, such cases fail to inform the lower
courts or the legislatures of the principles which guide the Court. Taken
with other Burger Court decisions, Cleburne demonstrates a pattern wherein
the Court uses heightened scrutiny only to review classifications that affect
classes with suspect characteristics, but reviews such classifications substan-
tively.2' 6 However, the failure of the Court to articulate such a standard is
particularly troubling. As Justice Marshall points out, such failure "provides
no principled foundation for determining when more searching inquiry is to
210. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1982), reserves regulation of the
insurance industry to the states.
211. Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1928).
212. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. at 1682 ("[tlhe validity of the view that
a State may not constitutionally favor its own residents . . . is confirmed by a long line of this
Court's cases so holding"). That bias is reflected in the privileges and immunites clause, the
full faith and credit clause, and the supremacy clause, as well as the commerce and equal
protection clauses.
213. The plaintiffs were a coalition of thirty-nine out-of-state insurance companies. Id. at
1679 n.4.
214. Id. at 1686-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
215. See supra notes 122-34 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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be invoked. Lower courts are thus left in the dark .. . and this Court
remains unaccountable for its decisions." 2 7
When the Burger Court was in its infancy, Professor Gunther sensed "a
Court divided, uncertain and adrift." 2 Fourteen years later, with the makeup
of the Court relatively unchanged, 2 9 equal protection analysis remains con-
fused. The pattern of decisions evidences a record of granting heightened
scrutiny on the basis of the relative political impotence of the challenging
class. However, with an unarticulated standard of review, a substantially
new Court would not be bound to practice the Burger Court's process-based
granting of review.2 11
Justice White's quote at the opening of this Note appropriately describes
the current state of equal protection. The broad patterns articulated by the
Warren Court and the early Burger Court have been narrowed as new
contexts have arisen. The Court has reached the point, however, where some
of the previous distinctions relied upon are no longer tenable and need to
be replaced. A rearticulation of equal protection analysis is needed to
encompass the principles that the Court already practices, but has failed to
preach. Such a rearticulation, based merely on the Court's past decisions,
could provide a useful guide for lower courts and legislatures and an enduring
legacy for the Burger Court.
Timothy J. Moore
217. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
218. Gunther, supra note 8, at 1.
219. The possibility of a "substantially new Court" in the near future is a subject of popular
speculation. See Serrill, An Illness Ties up the Justices, TIME, Apr. 8, 1985, at 59 (discussing
the age and health of the current members of the Court).
220. Cf. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Itlhe
suggestion that the traditional rational basis test allows . . . searching inquiry creates precedent
... to subject economic and commercial classifications to similar and searching 'ordinary'
rational basis review .... ").
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